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Introduction

No thinker strove more mightily than Hermann Cohen (1842–1918) did to seek the compatibility of Judaism with the teachings of modern philosophy. Writing voluminously as a university professor in Germany (he was the first Jew to hold a chair in philosophy there), Cohen won justifiable fame for working throughout his career to reground and update the system of his philosophical inspiration, Immanuel Kant, while concerning himself with its relationship to Jewish thought.

Cohen's sometimes forbidding prose advanced an extraordinary intellectual project that made secular and Jewish thought indissociable. As Moses Maimonides had done for the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages, Cohen saw Judaism as harmonious with the philosophy of his time—in Cohen's case, with Kant's call to bring philosophy beyond metaphysics in an age of human freedom. Yet Cohen also managed to interpret Judaism as one of the sources for Kant's venture. And Cohen believed that Kant's theory of human spontaneity as the foundation of ethics fulfilled the social vision of the Jewish prophets, leading to a moving program of ethical socialism for modern times.

In spite of its extraordinary significance, several events consigned Cohen's enterprise to near oblivion soon after his death shortly before the end of World War I. Existentialism, ascendant in secular and Jewish philosophy after that war, eclipsed Cohen's neo-Kantian vocation. And the reactionary victory of the Nazis shattered the "German-Jewish synthesis" that Cohen had once both defended and epitomized, even as it took Germany down a very different path than the humane socialist one of which Cohen had dreamed. Among Jews, Cohen's principled rejection of Zionist politics also marginalized him for much of the century following his death.

Yet at no time since the 1920s has interest among philosophers in Cohen's undertaking been greater than it is today. For students, this volume attempts to get closer to the core of his philosophical enterprise than the prior English-language collection of Cohen's writings, which dates from 1971. Cohen's monumental final work, *Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism* (1919) first appeared in English in 1972, but until now no translations of the neo-Kantian philosophy from the

height of his career have been available in English, making it difficult to appreciate Cohen's core project in conjunction with his Jewish philosophy.[1] And in part by placing the two side by side, our selections attempt to rescue Cohen from his dissident existentialist successors—above all, the famed German-Jewish thinker Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929)—who have controlled his legacy for too long.

Cohen's texts are difficult, if not—as Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945), Cohen's leading student, described them in a lecture before the Oxford Jewish Society in 1935—entirely "closed to a general understanding." Cohen's works, Cassirer added, "never could get any real popularity—and even the professional philosophers very often failed to overcome [their] difficulties."[2] Yet to assess Cohen without his neo-Kantian texts, or to read his Jewish writings without keeping in view aspects of the philosophical core of his enterprise, is to neglect one of the most impressive episodes of Jewish thought in modern times.

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Cohen was born in Coswig, a small town on the Elbe River in the Duchy of Anhalt. His father was cantor at the small synagogue there and religious teacher for the town's handful of Jewish families. Cohen always returned home for holidays and to visit his parents, but at age eleven he moved ten miles to Dessau (the birthplace of Moses Mendelssohn, Cohen's predecessor in modernizing Jewish thought), where he spent four years in German high school.[3] At age fifteen, Cohen traveled to Breslau, a Silesian city in what is now Poland, where he studied at its renowned Jewish seminary. Under still unclear circumstances, however, Cohen interrupted his path to rabbinic ordination after four years and transferred to the town's German university, where he continued to focus on the classical philology that had already been his main interest in seminary. After a year in Berlin, Cohen finished his philosophical training in Halle, where he earned his doctorate in 1865. At that time, however, there was little sign of the commitment to Kant's philosophy that would mark Cohen's later life.

After five years in Berlin as a tutor and an associate of the founder of an early form of anthropology and sociology called *Völkerpsychologie* (folk psychology), Cohen published the book that made his early reputation, *Kant's Theory of Experience* (1871). It was because of the enthusiasm for this book from one of the era's leading philosophers, Friedrich Albert Lange, that Cohen won the position at the University of Marburg, where Lange taught, that defined his long career. *Kant's Theory of Experience* was epoch-making in the history of the rise of the broader neo-Kantian movement in German philosophy, of which Cohen was the leading

exponent for decades. He became Lange's formal successor in 1876, teaching for forty years in the Hessian university town.

Kant's memory had fallen on hard times in German lands in the mid-nineteenth century, not least because of his apparent supersession by G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), whose philosophical legacy dominated the era (though Cohen resisted it from the first). The point is not that Cohen rediscovered Kant. The beginnings of neo-Kantianism are traditionally dated to the publication of Otto Liebmann's *Kant and the Epigones* (1865), and Cohen's initial interventions tried to resolve a heated dispute between Kuno Fischer and Adolf Trendelenburg, who proposed different readings of the epistemology of the Enlightenment thinker.[4] But Cohen's *Kant's Theory of Experience* argued not only for a general reclamation of its title thinker but also for a "critical idealism," with which Cohen and his students were associated ever afterward.[5]

Kant's transcendental idealism, especially in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), is an account of the necessary conditions for the possibility of human knowledge. Cohen reclaimed Kant not as a protopsychologist (as he had frequently been read earlier in the nineteenth century), but as a philosopher of the validity of knowledge. Like other neo-Kantians, Cohen did so in an age of the ascendancy of natural science. And with other neo-Kantians, Cohen's intent was to attack a reigning materialism to insist that only an idealism in Kant's lineage could furnish the epistemological foundation that natural science, like all knowledge, requires.

Kant proposed that human beings do not just passively receive sense impressions of a world that is really out there. We can know that world of things-in-themselves only as appearances, and therefore by means of what we bring to them—that is, as we represent them. This focus on representation is what made Kant's epistemology idealistic, but it was a transcendental idealism because it focused on the conditions for the possibility of knowing anything empirically. This was anthropocentric—Kant called his move a "Copernican revolution" in thought—but neither relativistic nor subjectivist, for the transcendental conditions of knowing are universal for human beings. Furthermore, Kant's transcendental idealism even allowed for justifying scientific laws as necessarily true claims about the world as we know it.

Cohen's restoration of Kant's transcendental project was important, but even more so was his interpretation of that project. In some of the most famous sections in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant proposed that space and time are among the a priori and necessary conditions of the possibility of knowing. In turn,

Fischer and Trendelenburg almost came to blows over whether Kant meant to rule out the possibility that things-in-themselves were also spatial and temporal, given that the appearances are necessarily represented in space and time. Cohen's masterstroke was to propose that the question was badly framed.

The entire purpose of Kant's philosophy, according to Cohen, was to restrict the theory of knowledge to what we can know, rather than pursuing "dogmatic" or metaphysical claims about things we cannot. Indeed, the radicalism of Cohen's approach was to suggest that the very concept of things-in-themselves was illegitimate. Its function was not ontological but methodological, aimed not at better grasping the nonhuman world but at improving human knowledge and allowing for its further progress. It was not as if modern philosophy could suppose that knowledge matches some reality beyond the bounds of sense to which the human mind regrettably does not have unmediated access. Rather, Kant's revolutionary outlook was that epistemology must be a theory of human knowledge and nothing else.

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This approach, especially if it unmoored philosophy from what humans cannot know, put in question what traditional religious commitments could justifiably look like in general—and Cohen's commitment to Judaism in particular. Kant had famously claimed that he had "limited reason to make room for faith," but the question of how the resulting faith would resemble religious traditions of the past haunted his project. Cohen was never troubled by this question, living his whole life as an observant Jew and always confident that he could reconcile Judaism and Kant's philosophy—and he even saw his Judaism as the source of that confidence. At the same time, he was aware from an early age that Kantianism ruled out most traditional understandings of religion, starting with the idea that the Bible is God's word, and it is equally possible to interpret Cohen's career as an apologetic quest to refashion Judaism in the name of fidelity to it. And as Cohen put it at the end of his career, "It is a question whether such reshaping is not the best form of annihilation."[6]

While a young professor in 1875, Cohen was shocked by the birth of modern political antisemitism, and he participated in the Berlin controversy around antisemitism kicked off by the historian Heinrich von Treitschke's public worry that the Jews were bad for the German people. It was not for nothing that a youthful Leo Strauss could call Cohen in 1925 "the greatest German Jew of his generation from within German Judaism and in the interest of German Juda-

ism."[7] Across Cohen's long career, notably in his famous (or notorious) World War I essays and pamphlet on "Germanism and Judaism" (*Deutschtum und Judentum*), he assumed that Jews were Germans and that the latter owed Judaism a great deal for the remarkable civilization they were achieving. Indeed, Cohen argued throughout his career not against German nationalism but for a cosmopolitan form of it in which Jews could participate with pride, out of loyalty to universal principles. (Cohen opposed Zionism for the same reason: it localized in one homeland what Jews brought to world politics in their different lands.) Then, in 1888, Cohen participated in the libel trial against a local antisemite who had alleged that the Talmud commanded Jews to be duplicitous toward their neighbors. Cohen contended that love of strangers is central to Jewish monotheism, with weighty consequences for the history of Western life.

For Kant, a move from epistemology to ethics had led to his most direct reconsideration of what role the idea of God played in philosophy as well as to the elaboration of his version of an Enlightenment rational religion. It was the same for Cohen, who published his second study of his predecessor, *Kant's Grounding of Ethics,* in 1877. In his introduction, Cohen announced his hope to be more Kantian when it came to ethics than Kant himself had been. This would remain true when, in 1904, Cohen published his own system of ethics, *Ethics of Pure Will* —important excerpts of which (from the second edition of 1907) this volume presents in English for the first time.

In his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), Kant had been concerned with justifying morality. After proving its basis in autonomous self-legislation and outlining its content as conforming to a universalization test and respect for the dignity of humanity, Kant struggled with what to say about the fact that human freedom—if it existed—was not knowable in the realm of appearances, though it was a necessary premise for action. In the spirit of his critical idealism, Cohen's goal was an ethics that did not need such a struggle. He hoped instead to derive the validity of ethics in just the way Kant had shown that space and time were necessary conditions of experience. Cohen applied the transcendental method of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* to ethics, which Kant had treated in another way. This was the reason why Cohen's study of ethics bore a title that matched Kant's original classic, promising an ethics of "pure will."

But there was one point on which Cohen followed Kant's ethics carefully and attempted to redeem it. In both his 1877 and 1904 ethical works, Cohen devoted special care to reconstructing and rehabilitating one of Kant's most

contentious arguments, reclaiming the idea of God for modern philosophy. Cohen agreed with Kant that the premodern attempt to prove God's existence had run aground. But both thinkers argued that the idea of God was a way of filling what Cohen called a gap that threatened not only his ethics but his entire system of thinking. Even in a system that bases ethics on good intentions, I am practically committed to the possibility of the practical success of my actions, in the same way that when I send a message, I trust that it can arrive. For Cohen, that commitment to the realizability of ethics in practice is what the idea of God guarantees, ensuring a connection between nature and ethics. To the objection that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is very different for believers than the God of the philosophers, who is less encountered or experienced than inferred or postulated, Cohen is said to have responded unrepentantly. To the question of how one can love God as an idea, Cohen replied with a disarming rhetorical question of his own: "How is it possible to love anything besides an idea?"[8]

In *Ethics of Pure Will*, Cohen offered a reductionist account of religion as ethics. In his own time, Kant had boldly affirmed that "even the Holy One of the Bible must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he is cognized as such."[9] Similarly, as late as his 1904 study Cohen equated religion and ethics, as if the first were nothing more than an inadequately justified version of the second. There were even signs that Cohen hoped that ethics would displace religion entirely, leading to "the end of religion."[10] Religion did not necessarily conflict with ethics, though it could—especially in its sectarian and violent forms. Religion could even provide a beautiful anticipation of ethical relations without the justification for them that philosophy alone could supply. But it was reasonable to wonder how Judaism could survive such statements, especially since Cohen made almost no reference to it in *Ethics of Pure Will* even while reassuring the Frankfurt Lodge of the B'nai B'rith that the book demonstrated "the meaning of Judaism within a philosophical system."[11]

There is agreement that Cohen's views shifted substantially in the final decade of his life, though controversy has raged about precisely how much and in what ways. Because of his reduction of religion to ethics in this phase, Cohen has been dogged by the suggestion that he refashioned Judaism in the image of progressive Protestantism.[12] But in his interim study, *The Concept of Religion in the System of Philosophy* (1915), Cohen gestured toward a limit in philosophy to be overcome by religion. It might make the latter indispensable, or at least useful, in a way that Cohen had not acknowledged before. And in his posthumous *Religion of Reason*, Cohen indicated religion's importance in the individuation of people.

It is clear that—rhetorically, at least—Cohen granted religion far more than the status of a kind of redundancy once a full-fledged philosophical ethics existed. And he also shifted his views about the relations of Judaism and Christianity to one another. Throughout his career, furthermore, Cohen spent far more time reinterpreting the traditional doctrines of Judaism than his prediction of the obsolescence of religion could explain.

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After beginning with *Ethics of Pure Will,* this volume turns to some of Cohen's engagements with Jewish tradition. For whether as a propaedeutic for ethics or as a supplement to them, there is no doubt that Cohen found interest and solace in interpreting those sources. These engagements with Jewish tradition occurred alongside his intermittent encounters with some of its greatest thinkers, such as Maimonides and Benedict Spinoza (whose pantheism Cohen ultimately rejected). The essays reach the heart of Cohen's characteristic integration of Judaism into Western civilization, in associating the Jewish past with the trajectory of philosophical idealism from its Platonic origins to Kant's modern rendition.

Throughout his career, including in his touchstone essay on Plato and the prophets, Cohen credited the founder of Western philosophy with the impulse to certify and secure knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) that Kant made modern in his discovery of a transcendental form of idealism. But Plato lacked the idea of universal humanity, especially the notion of its perfectibility in history. What was equally significant for Cohen, therefore, was that the Jewish prophets—while by no means philosophers and thus unable to validate ethics—made an indispensable contribution to the social good that ethics demands. In a sense, the prophets recognized love as its own form of knowledge, and—unlike Plato's fellow Greeks—oriented ethics not to heroism and valor but to the elimination of the suffering that can occur in human history. In this way, the prophetic sources of Judaism made it a precious resource in the history of Western civilization and—as Cohen eventually acknowledged—for any secular ethics. To play on a Kantian saying, without idealism, ethics is blind, but without the prophetic call for social justice, it is empty. Athens needed Jerusalem, and vice versa.

Gershom Scholem, a German Jew who became perhaps the greatest scholar of Jewish mystical traditions, referred to Cohen in an obituary as one of the "great men" given to the Jews who "carry with them the essence of the ancient prophets."[13] Daringly, Cohen not only insisted that prophetic social ideals needed Platonism (and vice versa), but that those ideals also helped pave the

way for Kant's theoretical and ethical project. Ironically, Kant had been acerbic about Judaism, repeating the Christian accusation that it amounted to no more than a superannuated dry legalism (equally ironically, such charges were also later made against Kant's thought). Unfortunately, Cohen remarked, Kant had been ignorant of the significance of the Jewish prophetic tradition; and in any event, Kant's desire to reinvent his Protestant legacy could not mask the concordance of his thought with the universal Jewish contribution to civilization. Furthermore, after the prophets, Jews insisted that their ethics were rationally defensible, just as Kant did in bringing about modern philosophy. Not only did Kant call for an ethical theory that recapitulated Judaism's original defense of obligation as grounded in freedom—and its approach to the divine—but his vision of a cosmopolitan plan for humanity also matched Judaism's messianism oriented toward suffering.[14] Cohen struggled passionately to establish that his neo-Kantianism and his Judaism overlapped so substantially in their teachings.

Though he wrote no freestanding works of political theory, Cohen's politics were in the vein of ethical and parliamentary socialism. Notwithstanding his patriotic allegiance to the German side in World War I, for which he propagandized, Cohen repudiated romantic nationalism. He lived through the economic tumult of the late nineteenth century and warned against ethnonationalism as a scapegoating response to it. Instead, Cohen argued for high taxation and worker representation, as well as supporting reforms to make schools religiously neutral and class-blind.[15] He had a significant impact on the development of a non-Marxist socialism, including on the "evolutionary socialism" of the social democratic theoretician Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), who followed Cohen in proposing to base a parliamentary movement on Kantian principles.

Cohen may not have been representative of German Jewry in his socialism, but he voiced an exemplary confidence among German Jews in a universalistic understanding of both German nationalism and the Jewish faith, which made him skeptical of the Zionist politics that emerged in Europe during his lifetime. In 1916, two years before his death, Cohen was embroiled in a controversy with the charismatic Zionist theoretician Martin Buber (1878–1965), who equally claimed the authority of the prophets but whom (among other errors) Cohen accused of disregarding the fact that Jews had done more than any people to contribute to world affairs.[16]

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Cohen passed away in April 1918, before World War I was formally concluded. After retiring, he had moved to Berlin, where he taught at a Jewish institute called the Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judentums. Almost immediately after his death, a dispute broke out about his legacy, centered on the meaning of his final writings. And in part because the philosophical fortunes of Cohen's project were so disastrous in the following decades, the wrong side may well have won. The intent of the third part of the selections in this book is to allow an assessment of whether it is time, as a number of contemporary scholars have argued, to reconsider the marginalization of Cohen's neo-Kantianism in the way in which his work is read. In particular, whether or not Cohen's project deserves to be surpassed in philosophical or political terms, it is common to believe that Cohen himself had overthrown it out of an aspiration to give way to a new form of thinking. The final texts in this volume suggest that this assumption is partisan and troubling.

"Don't you think that today we have seen a prophet die?" So Ernst Cassirer's wife, Toni, asked him, after Cohen's final hours.[17] Cohen had hoped that Cassirer would succeed him in his Marburg philosophical chair, but Cassirer's appointment was blocked—much to Cohen's consternation. At Cohen's funeral, three days after his death, Cassirer delivered an absorbing eulogy that celebrated his teacher and friend. While Cassirer reported that he had just begun to digest Cohen's posthumous work on religion, he strikingly affirmed the continuity of Cohen's career—and, indeed, the unity of the project of Marburg neo-Kantianism that Cassirer attempted to take forward. As the title and much of the substance of Cohen's last book implied, his allegiance to a religion of reason never wavered, while his personal compassion and piety were merely the embodied and individual side of his abstract commitments to rationalism.

If this view did not fare well in the following years, in general or Jewish philosophy, it was in part because of the coming of existentialism. In that movement, Rosenzweig—who knew Cohen intimately in his final years—was the most notable Jewish participant. Serving the German Empire as a soldier at the front in April 1918, Rosenzweig reflected right away on the very different Cohen he had come to know, who seemed—Rosenzweig claimed—to depart surreptitiously from the premises of the system he had laboriously constructed.[18] In a classic and enormously influential introduction to the compilation of Cohen's Jewish writings in 1924, Rosenzweig pursued this interpretation at length. Extrapolating clear innovations in Cohen's thought into full-fledged transformations and citing personal communications, Rosenzweig made the provocative

case that the neo-Kantian system collapsed of itself to give rise to the Jewish existentialism that Rosenzweig advocated.[19] In question is not just the legitimacy of the teleological reading according to which, as Strauss commented in 1925, "Rosenzweig understands Cohen's development from its end."[20] Also in question is whether its end strayed very far from its beginning and middle.

Though this volume does not provide all the materials needed to decide these questions, it provides Rosenzweig's interpretation in English for the first time, to be read in relation to the neo-Kantian core of Cohen's ethics and to Alexander Altmann's 1962 counterargument, likewise presented in English for the first time. Regardless, there is no doubt that after World War I, Cohen quickly came to be seen as a figure of the past. The appeal of his project waned, not only in Rosenzweig's filial appropriation but also in the siege that other existentialist philosophers such as Martin Heidegger brought to the neo-Kantian citadel. The same reversal of fortune that existentialism wrought philosophically occurred even more drastically in politics, which saw Germany and Europe stray so far from Cohen's ethical vision in practice that many later took that vision to be irretrievable—even before the Nazis put Martha Lewandowski Cohen, whom the philosopher had married in 1878, to death in 1942. (She died of severe malnutrition in Theresienstadt, the Nazi camp.)

Of course, a philosophical idealist in the tradition of Plato and Kant would be the first to insist that history provides no final verdict on morality. And contemporary philosophers—both in their reading of Kant and in their return to his thought—testify to the viability of a kind of project much like Cohen's. It is our hope that this volume will assist in the contemporary reassessment of Cohen, who may be not just a historic master thinker of forgotten secular and Jewish traditions, but a model for future endeavors in both.

Notes

1. The prior English-language collection, restricted to Jewish writings, is Hermann Cohen, *Reason and Hope: Selections from the Jewish Writings of Hermann Cohen*, trans. Eva Jospe (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971). The last book is Cohen, *Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism*, trans. Simon Kaplan, 2nd ed. with new introductions by Steven S. Schwarzschild and Kenneth Seeskin (New York: Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1995). For translations of individual books and pamphlets (mostly oriented to Cohen's place in Jewish philosophy), see the Suggestions for Further Reading, which also lists the English-language secondary literature.

2. Ernst Cassirer, "Cohen's Philosophy of Religion," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 1996, no. 1 (1996): 91.

3. I follow Frederick C. Beiser's magnificent *Hermann Cohen: An Intellectual Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

4. A classic statement is Ernst Cassirer, "Hermann Cohen and the Renewal of Kantian Philosophy," trans. Lydia Patton, *Angelaki* 10, no. 1 (April 2005): 95–108. The standard literature in English on neo-Kantianism includes Thomas C. Willey, *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860–1914* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1978); Klaus Christian Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy between Idealism and Positivism*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Frederick C. Beiser, *The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Manfred Kühn, "Interpreting Kant Correctly: On the Kant of the Neo-Kantians," in *Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy*, ed. Rudolf Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

5. For a brief excerpt from *Kant's Theory of Experience* in English, see Hermann Cohen, "The Synthetic Principles," in *The Neo-Kantian Reader*, ed. Sebastian Luft (New York: Routledge, 2015), 107–16.

6. Cited in Leo Strauss, preface to Leo Strauss, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken, 1965), 24–25.

7. Leo Strauss, review of Hermann Cohen, *Jüdische Schriften*, in *Jüdische Wochenzeitung für Cassel, Hessen, und Waldeck* 2, no. 18 (May 8, 1925), in Leo Strauss, "More Early Writings," *Interpretation* 39, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 118. See also Steven S. Schwarzschild, "'Germanism and Judaism': Hermann Cohen's Normative Paradigm of the German-Jewish Symbiosis (1979)," in Steven S. Schwarzschild, *The Tragedy of Optimism: Writings on Hermann Cohen*, ed. George Y. Kohler (Albany: SUNY Press, 2018), 93–118; Jacques Derrida, "Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German," trans. Moshe Ron, *New Literary History* 22, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 39–95.

8. Cohen, *Religion of Reason*, 160.

9. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 21.

10. Hermann Cohen, *Ethik des reinen Willens*, in *Werke*, 7:586.

11. Hermann Cohen to the Frankfurt Lodge, December 11, 1904, in Hermann Cohen, *Briefe*, ed. Bruno Strauss and Bertha Badt-Strauss (Berlin: Schocken, 1939), 71.

12. See, for example, Leora Batnitzky, *How Judaism Became a Religion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 53; David N. Myers, "Hermann Cohen and the Quest for Protestant Judaism," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 46 (2001): 195–212.

13. Gershom Scholem, "In Memory of Hermann Cohen," trans. Sander Gilman, *Modern Judaism* 5, no. 1 (February 1985): 1.

14. For more on this theme, see Andrea Poma, "Suffering and Non-Eschatological Messianism in Hermann Cohen's Ethics," in Andrea Poma, *Yearning for Form and Other Essays on Hermann Cohen's Thought* (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2006), 243–60.

15. This topic, neglected in Anglophone scholarship, has best been surveyed in Hermann Lübbe, *Politische Philosophie in Deutschland: Studien zu ihrer Geschichte* (Basel, Switzerland: Benno Schwabe, 1963), part 2. On school reform, see selection 3.

16. The main texts of the debate are translated in Martin Buber and Hermann Cohen, "Martin Buber and Hermann Cohen: A Debate on Zionism and Messianism," in *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 571–77.

17. Cited in Pierre Bouretz, *Witnesses for the Future: Philosophy and Messianism*, trans. Michael B. Smith (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 722n5.

18. Franz Rosenzweig, “Der Dozent: Eine persönliche Erinnerung,” *Neue jüdische Monatshefte*, May 10, 1918, 376–78.

19. On the personal communications, see Steven S. Schwarzschild, “Franz Rosenzweig’s Anecdotes about Hermann Cohen (1970),” in Schwarzschild, *The Tragedy of Optimism*, 35–42. For excellent examples of the more proleptic reading, see Bouretz, *Witnesses for the Future*; Peter Eli Gordon, *Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

20. Strauss, review, 125.